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Abstract: Experimental methods of policy evaluation are well-established in social policy and development 
economics but are rare in industrial and innovation policy. In this paper we consider the arguments for applying 
experimental methods to industrial policy measures, and propose an experimental policy evaluation approach 
(which we call RCT+). This approach combines the randomised assignment of firms to treatment and control 
groups with a longitudinal data collection strategy incorporating quantitative and qualitative data (so-called 
mixed methods). The RCT+ approach is designed to provide a causative rather than purely summative 
evaluation, i.e. to assess both ‘whether’ and ‘how’ programme outcomes are achieved. In this paper we assess 
the RCT+ approach through an evaluation of Creative Credits – a UK business-to-business innovation voucher 
initiative intended to promote new innovation partnerships between SMEs and creative service providers. The 
results suggest the potential value of the RCT+ approach to industrial policy evaluation, and the benefits of 
mixed methods and longitudinal data collection.  
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Assessing an experimental approach to industrial policy evaluation: Applying RCT+ to 
the case of Creative Credits 
 
1. Introduction 
Although unusual in terms of industrial policy, experimental methods of policy evaluation are 
well established in social policy and development economics. Burtless (1995, p. 63), for 
example, cites Greenberg and Schroder (1991) who ‘identified more than 90 separate field 
trials involving a wide range of distinctive research areas including health insurance, prisoner 
rehabilitation, labour supply, worker training and housing subsidies’. Banerjee and Duflo 
(2008, p. 32) also describe the ‘recent surge in experimental work’ in development 
economics. Typically such evaluations involve individual human subjects facing some 
common socio-economic problem, and random allocation of subjects to a treatment and 
control group. Differences in outcomes between the treatment and control groups are then 
attributed to the effect of the policy intervention. In terms of industrial policy, however, 
experimental policy evaluation approaches remain marginal, with non-experimental, ex post 
policy evaluations remaining the norm. In the context of small business policy evaluation, 
Potter and Storey (2007), for example, provide an extensive review of best practice in OECD 
countries without any mention of either the application or potential for experimental methods. 
Similarly, UK government guidance on industrial policy evaluation focuses entirely on non-
experimental ex post evaluation approaches (BIS 2009). Related observations might be made 
in relation to the evaluation of R&D and innovation policies: despite the increasing 
importance of evaluation as part of the process of development of technology policy, 
evaluation approaches remain almost universally ex post and non-experimental (Laredo 
1997).  
 
The methodological and practical advantages of experimental and non-experimental 
evaluation methods have been widely debated in the context of social policy interventions 
(Burtless 1995; Heckman and Smith 1995; Bratberg, Grasdal, and Risa 2002; Banerjee and 
Duflo 2011; Deaton 2010). Experimental methods based on randomised allocation have – at 
least in theory – the advantage of transparency and may be more convincing to policy-makers 
than the results of more complex econometric evaluation approaches (Burtless 1995). In 
small samples, however, perhaps less than 300, randomisation may be ineffective at ensuring 
the homogeneity of control and treatment groups (Bratberg, Grasdal, and Risa 2002), though 
3 
 
robust experiments can still be run with smaller samples if the intervention is sufficiently 
powerful (Bloom et al. 2011). Implementing experimental approaches may also lead to other 
specific biases (Heckman and Smith 1995), while small-scale experimental studies may fail 
to replicate the likely macro-impacts of a scheme which is implemented at national level – 
that is, they lack external validity (Garfinkel, Manski, and Michalopoulos 1990). Perhaps the 
key advantage of experimental approaches, however, and the central issue with non-
experimental evaluation approaches, relates to potential selection biases. In particular, if 
subjects which are allocated to a treatment group have a higher preponderance of some 
characteristic which is correlated with outcomes this will lead to bias in the estimation of 
treatment effects. Such biases may be significant where policy interventions are targeted at 
particular groups of subjects, where support is allocated on the basis of routinized decision 
rules, or where there is an element of self-selection into an experiment. One recent study, for 
example, illustrates how funding allocations in the Norwegian Research Council are based on 
ex ante project rankings generating a potential selection bias when evaluating the Research 
Council’s funding decisions (Bremnes, Bergem, and Nesset 2011). In terms of policy for 
innovation or small and medium enterprises (SMEs), similar selection biases might arise 
where a policy initiative seeks to back winners or is focussed on firms which have an 
established track record of growth or innovation. In this sense the receipt of public support 
may itself need to be treated as endogenous (Garcia and Mohnen 2010).  
 
As many methodological and implementation issues arise in industrial policy evaluations, 
which focus on firms, as they do in social policy, where the subjects are likely to be 
individuals. The selection biases are likely to be as great. However, arguably some of the 
ethical issues which arise in implementing experimental approaches to social policy may be 
seen as less significant in industrial policy interventions. It may be more ethically acceptable, 
for example, to randomly allocate public support among firms rather than adopting a similar 
allocation rule to the distribution of support among financially disadvantaged individuals. 
Nevertheless, the random allocation among firms needs to be carefully considered to ensure 
money is not simply thrown at applicants in the hope that they do something useful with it. 
Application criteria, an evidenced business need, project governance and, potentially, co-
funding can raise confidence in the ethical aspects of investing in companies’ innovation 
potential. This makes it all the more surprising that experimental evaluation approaches in 
industrial policy are not more common.  
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In this paper we propose and assess an experimental approach to the evaluation of new 
industrial policy interventions. Our approach (which we label RCT+ or Randomised Control 
Trial plus) takes advantage of randomisation, but combines this with a longitudinal and 
mixed methods data collection strategy to provide causative insights rather than only 
summative policy assessment. In other words, RCT+ seeks to evaluate the validity of an 
underlying logic model rather than simply generating point estimates of policy impact 
(Donaldson and Gooler 2003), and seeks to explain why these results are observed (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2005; Ludwig, Kling, and Mullainathan 2011). 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess the potential value of the RCT+ approach when applied to 
industrial policy. We make three main contributions. First, we provide an assessment of the 
value of experimental evaluation approaches to industrial policy initiatives, suggesting an 
alternative enhanced approach to the development of industrial policy. Second, through an 
application of the RCT+ approach we extend standard (quantitative) experimental evaluation 
approaches beyond the summative to provide causal explanations for policy outcomes – i.e. 
to identify the ‘why, how, and at what cost’ an intervention may have worked (White, 2008, 
p. 98). Adopting this type of rigorous qualitative approach provides potentially frame-
breaking insights (Eisenhardt, 1989), and may enable the conceptualisation of the context in 
which an intervention was implemented, facilitating the generalisation of results (White, 
2008). Third, our application of RCT+ shows how a longitudinal approach can provide a time 
profile of policy outcomes, without which policy-makers can make incomplete, and 
potentially misleading, inference. We apply the RCT+ approach to Creative Credits, a UK-
based business-to-business innovation voucher programme designed to foster new innovative 
partnerships between SMEs and creative service providers.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the rationale for 
industrial policy evaluation and review previous debates about the relative merits of 
experimental and non-experimental evaluation approaches. Subsequent sections of the paper 
report the application of the RCT+ evaluation approach to the Creative Credits experiment. 
Section 3 reports the application of the RCT+ approach and its outcomes. Section 4 discusses 
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the implications of the RCT+ experiment and the strengths and limitations of experimental 
methods in industrial policy evaluation. Parallels with meta-analytical approaches in 
medicine are also considered. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Evaluating industrial policy initiatives 
Potter and Storey (2007) identify five reasons why industrial policy evaluation might be 
undertaken: to establish the impact of industrial policy; to inform the allocation of funding to 
alternative policy measures; to demonstrate value for money; to stimulate debate about forms 
of public intervention; and, to contribute to improvements in the design and administration of 
policy interventions. In each case the problem of causal inference is the same, i.e. that the 
treated and non-treated outcomes for any single firm are never observed (Holland 1986). The 
analytical problem this raises is how to estimate the difference between the actual realised 
outcomes and the potential outcomes if no treatment had been administered. Ideally, the 
substitute for the unobserved (un-treated) outcome needs to meet two criteria: (i) it should be 
observable to the researcher; and, (ii) it should be an 'internally' valid substitute for the set of 
un-treated outcomes. Internal validity in this sense requires that ‘the only difference between 
the member of the control group and the member of the treated group corresponds to the fact 
that the latter is treated and the first one is not’ (Reiner, 2011, p. 18).  
 
More comprehensively, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) outline three situations which 
describe the allocation of subjects to a control and treatment group. The first, and simplest, is 
the classical experimental situation of randomised allocation in which allocation is unrelated 
to outcomes. The second allocation mechanism – ‘un-confounded allocation’ – occurs where 
assignment is independent of outcomes but may be related to subject characteristics. Here, 
where the assignment mechanism is either observable or discoverable, sampling and/or 
statistical approaches can be used to minimise any systematic differences between the 
characteristics of the treatment and control groups and provide a valid estimate of treatment 
effects (Burtless 1995). In practice, evaluations of SME policy vary in the sophistication of 
their approach to un-confoundedness. Potter and Storey (2007), for example, cite evaluation 
studies which compare the performance of treated firms with control groups of ‘typical’ firms 
(Lambrecht and Pirnay 2005), and studies which use ‘matched’ control groups based on 
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treatment and control groups with similar baseline characteristics (Lerner 1999). However, 
despite careful matching or selection of control groups, the potential remains for bias in terms 
of the background characteristics of the two groups (Bratberg, Grasdal, and Risa 2002).  
 
This has led to the development and widespread application of a third group of econometric 
approaches which can ‘control’ ex post for potential selection biases by either implicitly or 
explicitly modelling the probability that a firm will be in the treatment rather than the control 
group, and then estimating the impact of the treatment ‘controlling’ for any selection biases 
(Bratberg, Grasdal, and Risa 2002; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). Implementing this type of 
non-experimental approach, however, often involves making assumptions about the 
underlying causal process which determines the allocation of firms to the treatment and non-
treated groups (Burtless 1995). Specific approaches may also pose challenges in terms of 
identification, requiring, for example, the use of a variable or group of variables which 
influence allocation but which have no influence on subsequent outcomes. Early comparisons 
of non-experimental econometric estimators with experimental estimators tended to favour 
experimental estimators (Heckman and Hotz, 1989), and highlighted the sensitivity of the 
results of non-experimental studies to the choice of econometric approach (Bratberg, Grasdal, 
and Risa 2002). This led Burtless (1995) to conclude that: ‘the classical experimental 
estimator still has a major advantage over non-experimental estimators for users who care 
about the statistical precision of the estimates they use. But the more important advantage is 
that the validity of the experimental estimator depends upon assumptions that are ordinarily 
much easier to evaluate – and to believe’ (Burtless 1995, p. 73). More recently, however, 
developments in propensity scoring, matching estimators and instrumental variables provide 
alternative statistical approaches to dealing with un-confoundedness in different contexts 
(Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). This type of evaluation, allowing for potential selection 
biases, has been emphasised by the OECD as best practice in ex post evaluation and has been 
widely applied in recent years in the context of SME support measures (Potter and Storey 
2007). 
 
Thus, in non-experimental evaluations either un-confounded or confounded allocation – 
where allocation has some dependence on potential outcomes – can have profound 
implications for a researcher’s ability to obtain reliable estimates of treatment effects. In 
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experimental approaches, by contrast, random assignment to the treatment and control group 
should avoid such biases and allow more accurate estimation of treatment effects (Burtless 
1995). A number of potential implementation issues arise, however, even with experimental 
designs involving randomised allocation (Reiner 2011). First, in small samples randomised 
allocation may fail to eliminate differences in the characteristics of firms in the treatment and 
control groups, influencing the internal validity of the experiment. As a result Bruhn and 
McKenzie (2009) suggest that in small samples (30-100 observations in their simulations) the 
similarity of treatment and control groups is better where pair-wise matching, stratification or 
re-randomisation approaches are used rather than simple random allocation. For larger 
sample sizes (>300), however, their simulation analysis suggests that the choice of 
randomisation approach is a much less significant factor. A second threat to internal validity 
in experimental studies highlighted by Heckman and Smith (1995) is the potential for 
substitution bias where members of a control group are able to substitute alternative forms of 
support for the focal treatment effect. If significant, this contamination may undermine the 
estimate of the treatment derived from the difference in outcomes between the treatment and 
control groups. In the context of an industrial policy initiative where the subjects are firms 
rather than individuals it is also possible to envisage a related ‘signalling bias’ where firms in 
the treatment group are able to attract additional investment because they are in the treated 
group. Meuleman and Maeseneire (2012), for example, find that Belgian SMEs which 
obtained an R&D subsidy were better able to access long-term debt than other firms. This 
type of effect may again influence the scale of any measured treatment effect.  
 
Finally, it is not clear how readily the results of any single policy experiment involving a 
small proportion of a target population can be generalised to the entire target population, i.e. 
whether the results of small scale policy experiments are ‘externally’ valid. Garfinkel et al 
(1990), for example, focus on the ‘macro’ or society-wide effects which would occur if an 
intervention was implemented at macro-level but may not be replicated in small scale studies. 
These include: policy effects on the economic equilibrium; widespread diffusion of 
information about the programme; and, social interaction and norm formation which might 
influence programme participation or other related decisions. External validity may also be 
reduced if the characteristics of those firms participating in a programme differ significantly 
from the wider target group (Burtless 1995). Applicants for innovation support measures, for 
example, may be more strongly innovation-oriented than firms in general, a capability which 
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has been linked to above average business performance (Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, and 
Bausch 2011). External validity may also be impacted by ‘randomisation bias’, the idea that 
the adoption of random allocation itself might either induce or discourage some types of 
firms from applying for a scheme (Heckman and Smith 1995).  
 
While internal and external validity have been widely discussed in the summative, ex post 
evaluation literature, similar themes also emerge in respect of evaluations which adopt a 
constructivist or qualitative approach. Guba and Lincoln (1989), for example, emphasise 
trustworthiness, the nature of the evaluation process and authenticity as key attributes of 
robust qualitative evaluation approaches. They describe trustworthiness as a group of 
robustness criteria (i.e. credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability) that are 
‘parallel’ to the experimental criteria of internal/external validity, reliability and objectivity; 
parallel due to ontological and epistemological differences (p. 233). Guba and Lincoln (1989) 
describe a second criterion, which they call process, as evaluating how the data was 
accumulated and the rigour used to ensure it accurately reflects the context (p. 244). 
However, because the trustworthiness criterion does not ensure that stakeholders’ 
constructions have been collected and faithfully represented within the messiness of research 
(p. 245), and the process criterion does not provide explicit evidence, there is a third criterion 
– authenticity. Authenticity provides balancing aspects of: the fairness of integration of all 
viewpoints; the extent to which (through the process of the evaluation) stakeholders expand 
their own constructions and their constructions of others; the action facilitated by the 
evaluation; and, the empowerment of stakeholders to act. Attending to these three criteria 
helps to develop constructivist evaluations that are rigorous and from which translatable 
results can emerge. 
 
The statistical and interpretative arguments favouring experimental evaluation approaches 
may in some circumstances be reinforced by economic arguments related to the potential for 
adverse selection in more traditional evaluation approaches, and the relative costs of basing 
allocation on randomisation and, say, peer group evaluation. For example, in SME and 
innovation programmes,  public support is often allocated on the basis of some ex ante 
screening or peer evaluation process (which GPrix (2012) calls ‘cream-skimming’). As in 
equity investments, this situation involves asymmetric information with the firm having an 
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incentive to over-estimate the strength of its project proposal. This creates the potential for 
adverse selection and the backing of weaker projects (Reiner, 2011). Evaluation or screening 
of programme applications is also resource intensive, and may be uneconomic particularly 
where the public support being offered to each firm is relatively small (Takalo and Tanayama 
2010). In the case of innovation voucher schemes, for example, where the support available 
to each firm is typically small, undertaking detailed due diligence on each applicant company 
and project is not cost-effective, providing an additional economic rationale for randomised 
allocation. 
 
3. Applying RCT+ 
3.1 Experiment rationale, design and conduct 
We apply the RCT+ methodology to the Creative Credits programme, an innovation voucher 
programme intended to stimulate new partnerships between SMEs and creative service 
providers. Such partnerships may influence the innovation performance of firms through 
stimulating creativity, enhancing product quality and providing reputational benefits which 
signal the quality of firms’ innovation activities (Powell 1998).  Developing external 
partnerships may pose particular challenges for SMEs, however, associated with resource 
constraints (van de Vrande et al. 2009) and potentially behavioural failures on the part of 
managers such as inertia, excessive risk aversion, and myopia (Potts and Morrison 2009). 
Policy-makers have responded with instruments such as innovation vouchers to overcome 
these constraints with an EU survey in 2009 identifying 23 such schemes across Europe at 
regional and national level (DG ENTR-Unit D2 2009) although the number of schemes has 
probably increased since that point1. Such schemes have proved very popular with SMEs, 
having low entry barriers and playing a role in enabling small firms to access the knowledge 
necessary for innovation. The revenue stream provided by innovation vouchers has also 
encouraged knowledge providers to engage more actively with SMEs (Good and Tiefenthaler 
2011; Biggar Economics 2009). 
 
                                                 
1 Perhaps the best known innovation voucher scheme remains that operated in the Netherlands which, like many 
such schemes, aimed to overcome or lower the barriers which SMEs face in developing innovative partnerships 
with universities and colleges (Cornet, van der Steeg, and Vroomen 2007; Cornet, Vroomen, and van der Steeg 
2006). 
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The logic model for the Creative Credits scheme is shown in Figure 1 and links the 
justification for public intervention in the relationship between SMEs and creative service 
providers, the scheme’s objectives, the process by which the scheme operates, its immediate 
outputs and intended longer term outcomes (Donaldson and Gooler 2003)2. In the short term, 
scheme outputs are measured primarily in terms of increased levels of project additionality, 
i.e. the frequency of interactions between SMEs and creative businesses. In the longer term, 
we anticipate that this might generate three types of scheme outcome: output additionality, as 
the innovations developed impact on sales and growth (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper 2009); 
behavioural additionality, as organisational learning takes place and SMEs learn to work with 
and value more highly creative inputs to innovation (OECD 2006; Buiseret, Cameron, and 
Georgiou 1995; Georghiou 2004); and, network additionality, as SMEs extend their future 
collaborative networks (Consult 2006). The logic model also highlights that these medium- to 
long-term outcomes are contingent on other factors, most notably the business environment. 
Applying RCT+ allows us to focus on the ‘causative’ elements of the logic model. In other 
words, our evaluation objective is not just to assess scheme outcomes but also to consider 
whether these outcomes are being achieved through the mechanisms envisaged in the logic 
model (Chen 1990). This requires a theoretically grounded analysis of process and causal 
mechanisms alongside the evaluation of outcomes (Ludwig, Kling, and Mullainathan 2011).  
 
 
The policy experiment was conducted in the Manchester City Region of North-West England 
between September 2009 and October 2010 with firms’ applications being sought in two 
waves. The first wave opened for applications in September 2009 and the second in February 
2010. The Creative Credits scheme was promoted and marketed through a number of media 
channels, business networks and tele-marketing. In promoting the scheme care was taken to 
minimise any selection biases. For example, companies tele-marketing the scheme used 
random methods of identifying which SMEs to call to promote the scheme (Bakhshi et al. 
2013, p. 43). Over two thousand firms made some form of enquiry about the scheme with a 
total of 672 SMEs making eligible applications: 312 in the first wave and 501 in the second, 
141 firms applied in both waves3. On receipt, applications from SMEs were first checked for 
                                                 
2 Supporting evidence is found in Bakhshi and McVittie (2009), Stam, de Jong and Marlet 
(2008) and Muller, Rammer and Truby (2009) which all report that businesses which make 
proportionately greater use of creative services introduce more innovations. 
3 This was equivalent to around 1:8 of the eligible business population (Bakhshi et al. 2011, p. 12). 
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eligibility4, Creative Credits were then randomly distributed across applicant firms. In total 
one hundred and fifty Creative Credits were ‘awarded’ in two equal groups roughly six 
months apart. Each Creative Credit had a face value of £4,000 with recipient firms also 
required to contribute a minimum of £1,000 to the cost of the project. Subsequent to the 
award, SMEs were encouraged to identify a new creative partner and develop a collaborative 
project proposal5. Once a partnership was formed, all projects were required to be completed 
within five months. 
 
We examined the effectiveness of randomisation by comparing some of the key 
characteristics of the control and treatment firms at the time Creative Credits were awarded 
(Table 1). As anticipated, no significant differences were evident in the ownership status, 
exporting behaviour or prior innovation activity of the treatment and control firms. Firms in 
the treatment group were, however, significantly less likely to have engaged in R&D prior to 
their Creative Credits project than firms in the control group. As R&D is generally linked 
positively to innovation (Roper and Arvanitis 2012; Forsman 2011; Hoffman 1998), we 
might anticipate ceteris paribus that future innovation might also be lower among the 
treatment group (biasing downwards estimates of output additionality) (Bakhshi et al. 2013, 
p. 49-50). To compare the characteristics of scheme applicants and the population of eligible 
firms we conducted a small ancillary survey of non-applicant firms (Bakhshi et al. 2011). 
This suggested that applicants were similar in size to the eligible population but were less 
likely to be exporters, more likely to have a high proportion of graduate employees and 
engaged in prior innovation (Bakhshi et al. 2011, pp. 15-16). As discussed later in the paper 
these differences have implications for the external validity and generalizability of the results 
from our RCT+ evaluation.  
 
Data collection for the quantitative element of the RCT+ evaluation comprised four 
sequential surveys of the treatment and control groups. Survey 1 was a baseline survey 
undertaken at the time firms were awarded a Creative Credit and allocated to the treatment 
                                                 
4 Eligibility details are outlined in detail in Bakhshi et al. (2013). They included criteria relating to location, size 
and legal status.  
5 To help with this process a web-based marketplace – a Creatives Gallery – of eligible creative firms was 
designed and made available to all eligible SMEs in the treatment and control groups. The aim of creating the 
online Gallery was to explore the potential for a minimal brokerage model and reduce the burden of 
administrative costs of the pilot project. SMEs were not allowed to work with creative companies which they 
had previously worked with, however.  
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and control groups. Survey 2 was undertaken around six months after Survey 1, at a point just 
after the firms in the treatment group had completed their projects. Questions in Survey 2 
related primarily to project additionality. Surveys 3 and 4 undertaken six month and twelve 
months later focussed on output, behavioural and network additionality. Over the course of 
the four surveys, and despite the payment of small cash incentives to firms to encourage 
continued participation in the data collection, significant attrition in response was 
experienced. By Survey 4, response numbers in the control group had fallen to 157, 52.2 per 
cent of those firms responding to Survey 1. In the treatment group attrition was less severe, 
with 78.0 per cent of Survey 1 respondents also responding to Survey 4. A key issue in terms 
of the internal validity of the experiment was whether the characteristics of the respondents to 
all of the four surveys and those firms which dropped out were similar, or whether attrition 
was systematically related to some respondent characteristic. Comparing the starting 
characteristics (from Survey 1) of stayers and those firms which did drop out, however, 
suggested no systematic differences to the initial control and treatment groups. This suggests 
that despite significant attrition this aspect of the internal validity of the experiment was 
maintained. Annex 1 provides a more detailed discussion of attrition and our tests for the 
representativeness of the longitudinal sample of firms which responded to all four surveys.  
 
Data collection for the qualitative element of the RCT+ evaluation adopted a Cresswell 
(2011) explanatory mixed methods approach to bring rigour and provide insight to the 
quantitative phases through its integration with emerging qualitative results. Our qualitative 
research comprised of 4 stages of longitudinal data collection that involved 25 case studies 
with SMEs and their creative partners – recruited through a randomised process. The timing 
of the 4 stages aligned with the quantitative surveys. The case studies included 106 semi-
structured interviews, multi-organisational workshops, and ethnographic direct observations 
of SME practices. Alongside Survey 1, 43 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 
SMEs (24) and their creative partners (19). For Survey 2, a further 36 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with the same organisations (22 SMEs and 14 creative partners), 
and Survey 4 added 27 interviews (19 SMEs and 8 creative partners). Interview questions 
explored core issues from the survey in depth to provide meaning, and probed to enable 
respondents to give their views on the scheme and their working relationships with their 
partner SMEs. Survey 3 was accompanied by two group workshops facilitated by members of 
the research team which included fourteen firms in the treatment group (Eden and 
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Ackermann 1998). These workshops focussed on themes arising from the qualitative data 
gathered alongside Surveys 1 and 2, and contributed to the development of topics and 
questions for the Stage 4 quantitative survey and qualitative interviews6. Attrition in the 
qualitative sample, due to firms ceasing trading or refusing to continue to participate in 
interviews, resulted in longitudinal qualitative data being available from 11 pairings plus the 
‘surviving’ member of five other partnerships. 
 
Qualitative data collection and analysis was guided by the constant comparative method 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990) which is central to grounded theory methodology (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967; Glaser 1998; Katz 1983), and complements longitudinal explanatory designs 
(Cresswell and Plano Clark 2011). This allowed substantive concepts and trends to emerge 
from a comparison of the data collected over the four stages. Qualitative data analysis 
involved a process of open coding to identify concepts and then axial coding to establish 
higher-level categories and identify relationships between the open codes (Glaser 1998). 
Then selective coding refined codes until clear relationships between them were identified, 
leading to the development of a theory about the data. Themes identified from each stage 
informed subsequent stages of both the qualitative and quantitative data collection, providing 
theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The longitudinal aspect of the interviews 
provided opportunities to confront the emerging theory with further data, and move towards 
theoretical saturation. Rigour was ensured through three types of triangulation (Yin 2003). 
Data triangulation corroborated findings in different types and sources of qualitative data. 
Investigator triangulation ensured that analyses were conducted on data by more than one 
researcher to avoid investigator bias (Bryman 2004). Methodological triangulation involved 
different data (interviews, workshops, observations) being analysed using different 
techniques (manual and software-supported approaches) to search for generic findings 
(Bryman 2001). Furthermore, as respondents agreed to be taped and all interviews were 
transcribed, data was analysed in its totality several times (Gillham 2000). As such the 
application of thematic data analysis, contributes towards protecting the confidentiality and 
anonymity of the 25 case study respondents.  
                                                 
6 Where results from the qualitative data are reported in the form of quotations or conclusions from interviews, 
each business has been allocated a letter and number to signify SMEs in the treatment group (S), their creative 
partners (C) and their participation in wave 1 or wave 2 of the experiment. So, for example, W1S1 relates to 
wave 1, SME 1. Any unattributed quotes come from the ‘free format comments’ boxes in the quantitative 
surveys and therefore cannot be attributed under the non-disclosure terms of those surveys. 
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 3.1 Evaluation results 
The first question considered in the RCT+ evaluation was the extent of project additionality, 
i.e. the extent to which the award of a Creative Credit increased the probability that an SME 
entered into a new relationship with a creative business (Figure 1). Modelling suggests that 
the Creative Credits treatment increased the probability that firms went ahead with their 
project within the five months since allocation of the Creative Credits by around 84 per cent 
(Table 3) 7, a level of project additionality very similar to that reported for the pilot Dutch 
innovation vouchers scheme (Cornet, Vroomen, and van der Steeg 2006)8. Evaluations of the 
Swiss and Austrian innovation voucher schemes suggest similarly high levels of project 
additionality (Good and Tiefenthaler 2011).  
 
The quantitative Dutch, Swiss and Austrian innovation voucher evaluations explained their 
results summatively but not causally. With RCT+, our qualitative data identified two factors 
that underpinned the robust quantitative estimates of project additionality. First, SMEs 
described how their project fed operational plans and how they anticipated it would enable 
them to market their company offering more widely (in line with the stated objectives of the 
scheme). Second, a number of companies indicated how the Creative Credit had helped them 
to ‘accelerate things’ (respondent from Wave 1 SME 8 – W1S8):  ‘I’d have waited until we’d 
accumulated more money. And then probably programmed it in for sort of the back end of 
this year’ (W1S10). In only a minority of cases included in the interviews did Creative 
Credits instigate projects that would not otherwise have taken place: ‘couldn’t have afforded 
[the project, so] wouldn’t have done it but it has made a real difference’ (W1S9).  
 
Output additionality should be reflected in identifiable differences in the sales and innovation 
profiles of the treatment and control groups in the period shortly after the completion of the 
treatment. In the RCT+ evaluation, survey-based comparisons were made 6 months and 12 
                                                 
7 Of the 301 firms in the control group which responded to our baseline survey, 36 firms (12 per cent) went 
ahead anyway with their projects. Among the group of 150 firms which were assigned Creative Credits 144 
(96.0 per cent) actually commissioned projects. 
8 We modelled project additionality using both simple OLS and as a robustness check a treatment model 
allowing for potential sample selection. As expected, selection effects proved insignificant. As part of the same 
exercise we also investigated whether the small cash incentives provided to firms to help encourage survey 
response had biased these results. No evidence of any significant bias could be identified Details of these 
models and those referred to later in this section can be found in Bakhshi et al. (2013).  
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months after the completion of the Creative Credits project. At each point we measured 
firms’ innovation activity in the previous six months using three binary measures: whether 
the firm had undertaken any product/service innovation; whether they had undertaken any 
new to the market innovation; and, whether they had undertaken any process innovation. Six 
months after the end of the treatment, firms in the treatment group were significantly more 
likely to be undertaking product/service and process innovation, and had (at the 10 per cent 
level) a significantly more positive distribution of sales growth rates than firms in the control 
group (Table 3). These positive output additionality effects were short-lived, however, with 
no significant differences between the treatment and control groups in product/service or 
process innovation or sales growth distribution evident 12 months after the end of the 
treatment (Table 3). To test the robustness of the RCT+ results we used multivariate models 
allowing for potential selection effects which confirmed the RCT+ results (Bakhshi et al. 
2013)9.  
 
Inevitably there were exceptions but, in the short-term, the qualitative element of the RCT+ 
analysis suggested a largely positive feeling about the Creative Credits scheme. The majority 
of innovations involved website enhancements and/or the development of marketing 
collateral and SMEs had generally positive expectations of the impact of these on their 
business. However longer-term, the qualitative data supported the absence of any boost to 
sales growth. Many SMEs, like their wider markets, experienced a drop in sales over the 
period which tended to push them towards focusing on winning contracts or obtaining 
support from banks, taking attention away from their innovation, so undermining the value of 
the project. As one SME reported: ‘like sticking a Band Aid on a much bigger problem’ 
(W1S3). For a few SMEs the impact was low because they were dissatisfied with their 
innovation outcome: ‘If I was to pay that out of my own account I would just not be happy at 
all’. 
 
 
Behavioural additionality is measured here primarily in terms of firms’ innovation intentions. 
Firms in the treatment and control groups were asked: ‘Over the next three years how likely 
                                                 
9 These sales effects may under-estimate the longer sales benefits of Creative Credits. Twelve months after the 
end of the project – in Survey 4 – firms were asked how long they expected the benefits to persist. On average 
firms indicated that the benefits of their projects were likely to persist for a further 2.5 years, or 3.5 years after 
the end of the project. To capture these longer-term effects we calculated a net present value for the scheme 
which we estimated at 1.37 depending on the assumptions made (Bakhshi et al. 2013, Annex 5). 
16 
 
are you to develop new or significantly improved …’. Six different dimensions of innovation 
were considered: goods or services, processes, corporate strategy, advanced management 
techniques, organisational structure and marketing. We found no significant differences in 
future innovation intentions between the treatment and control groups after either 6 or 12 
months (Table 4). This RCT+ finding was again confirmed in a multivariate analysis 
(Bakhshi et al. 2013). Despite this, significant proportions of firms in the treatment group 
reported enhancements to their innovative capacity as a result of their Creative Credits 
project, though this result was not testable in comparison with the control group. This result 
was echoed in the qualitative analysis which revealed significant behavioural change. In 
previous innovations many SMEs had ‘muddled along’ (W2S11) alone, either delivering 
creativity in-house without the required skills, outsourcing to cheap (unprofessional) 
alternatives, or outsourcing to a professional supplier without a proper budget (e.g. W2S11, 
W2S2). Creative Credits provided a learning opportunity for SMEs, and some SMEs received 
knowledge on the creative process: ‘to see how it’s all put together … how they do it’ 
(W1S3). In some cases this was used to educate senior managers who preferred (low quality) 
in-house creative supply that ‘sometimes you outsource’ and bring ‘fantastic agencies on 
board’ and help them realise the added value by ‘open[ing] ... people’s eyes’ (W2S11) to the 
need for changing behaviour. Skills transfer was designed into some contracts (e.g. media 
training (W1S1) and website management (W2S2)), while other SMEs received reusable 
knowledge/skills as a by-product, for example on: writing marketing collateral (W1S3); web 
site design (W1S4); non-traditional advertising (W1S5). However, this learning was 
sometimes painful (W1S11) and complex, ‘a complete can of worms’ (W1S10), which 
hindered inter-organisational learning, limiting behavioural additionality. For example, the 
inaccessible/technical language which suppliers and customers use (W1S2) delayed benefits 
and disrupted/jeopardised the innovation.  
 
 
Some creative companies aimed to encourage behavioural additionality by transferring 
knowledge and tools (e.g. respondent from Wave 2 Creative 14 (W2C14) and W2C17), 
however, this was burdensome (W2C12): ‘small client syndrome, education time is high... a 
lot of hand-holding, it’s the worst part of the job’ (W2C18).  
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Network additionality was measured using a similar question to that for behavioural 
additionality. Six and twelve months after the end of the Creative Credits project firms were 
asked: Over the next three years how likely are you to co-operate with the following 
innovation partners. Eight different partner types were then identified (Table 5). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly given our results on behavioural additionality, we also found no evidence of 
any significant network additionality, i.e. no significant differences between the treatment 
and control groups in the propensity to co-operate on future innovation (Table 5). Again this 
RCT+ result was confirmed using multivariate models allowing for potential selection bias 
(Bakhshi et al. 2013). In this respect our results are again similar to those in the Dutch 
innovation voucher scheme, where follow-up after 18 months suggested no evidence of 
persistent additionality effects either in the formation of new partnerships or the development 
of new products or processes (Cornet, van der Steeg, and Vroomen 2007). One possible 
reason for the lack of longer-term effects suggested in relation to the Austrian and Swiss 
innovation voucher evaluations, is the small size of many voucher recipients and the 
difficulty which they have in establishing follow-up partnerships (Good and Tiefenthaler 
2011).  
 
 
In interviews, findings on network additionality pointed to three considerations. First, for 
some SMEs their Creative Credits project had been based on a ‘transactional’ relationship 
with their creative service providers: ‘a one-off hit where they got something for free’ 
(W1C7). Indeed, fifteen of the nineteen SMEs interviewed at the time of Survey 4 referred to 
having already worked with other creative businesses prior to the Creative Credits scheme. 
For these firms, Creative Credits encouraged them to work with a new creative partner, but 
generated little new organisational learning about effective partnering with creative 
businesses in general.  Consequently, most SMEs ended their working relationship with their 
Creative Credits partner when their project had completed, consistent with their previous 
working relationships with creative businesses (W1S1, W1S10, W2S8, W2S6, W2S7, 
W2S12, W1S12). A second reason for the lack of sustained network additionality was 
dissatisfaction with their creative partner (W2S2, W1S7, W1S8, W1S11, W1S3). Sometimes 
this related to not building lasting personal relationships with the supplier. At other times, the 
dissatisfaction related to the attitude of their creative partner: ‘it did feel that they were in a 
sense had bigger fish to fry than our project’ (W2S4) but SMEs ‘trusted in them to do it all 
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really’ but more SME involvement could have ensured it went ‘in the direction I wanted it to 
go in’ (W1S7). Creative suppliers verified these difficulties, also emphasising communication 
issues, different interpretations of project objectives, not receiving input data, client dithering, 
and differing priorities: ‘We had to hold their hand all the way through it’ (W2C12). The 
third reason for the lack of sustained networking additionality was the lack of brokerage or 
assistance with identifying/managing the creative partner. SMEs advised that additional 
networking could help by ‘actually go[ing] and meet[ing] a few of these other companies … I 
would get heaps more out of the project’.  
 
 
4. Discussion  
The aim of the evaluation reported here is to assess the potential value of experimental 
approaches to industrial policy evaluation. The RCT+ experimental evaluation approach we 
apply has three main elements: randomised assignment of firms to the treatment and control 
groups; a longitudinal approach to data collection; and, the use of a mixed-methods data 
collection strategy. In this section we assess the value of each of these elements of the 
evaluation in terms of internal and external validity. We also consider the value and 
interpretation of evidence from single policy experiments such as that conducted here 
building on approaches from medicine.  
 
Central to all experiments is the randomised allocation of subjects to the treatment and 
control groups to ensuring internal validity (Burtless 1995). Randomisation also enables the 
evaluator to avoid issues of sample selection rather than having to control for these ex post. 
Randomisation itself, however, has some limits. In large samples randomisation will result in 
no significant differences between the characteristics of the treatment and control groups. In 
our RCT+ trial, however, in relatively small samples we identified some significant 
differences between the treatment and control groups at the time that Creative Credits were 
awarded (Table 1). These systematic and significant differences between the characteristics 
of the treatment and control group illustrate the potential limitations of randomised 
allocation, even where samples are above the critical threshold (c. 300 observations) 
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highlighted by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009), imparting a bias of unknown extent to any 
evaluation results.  
 
Another aspect of internal validity is the appropriateness of the timescale over which policy 
effects are measured and additionality interpreted. Behavioural or network benefits from 
measures such as Creative Credits, for example, may take some time to translate both into 
new innovation and innovation outcomes (Cunningham, Gök, and Laredo 2013). A priori, it 
is also difficult to assess how long the delays may be between any specific policy initiative 
and its impacts. Adopting a single impact period – as in the majority of innovation 
evaluations – may therefore either miss or under-estimate the true effect of any initiative. To 
address this problem our RCT+ approach, which aims to capture both short-term impacts and 
longer-term outcomes, adopts a longitudinal data collection strategy, measuring impacts at 
different times after project completion. In the case of Creative Credits this proved important 
in revealing significant differences in the profile of output additionality after six months and 
twelve months. After six months significant innovation and sales effects were evident,  
effects which had lost their significance after twelve months. Measuring output additionality 
at either single point would therefore have provided an incomplete and potentially misleading 
assessment of output additionality (Roper 2013). Adopting a longitudinal data collection 
approach in industrial policy experiments therefore helps to avoid potentially misleading 
inference and assess any additionality-sustainability trade-offs which may arise in policy 
outcomes (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper 2011).  
 
Understanding the reasons why a particular outcome profile results from a policy initiative 
requires qualitative insights, the third element of the RCT+ methodology. In particular, 
although many SMEs in the Creative Credits treatment group highlighted positive aspects of 
working with their creative partner, our longitudinal case-studies highlighted issues which 
may have contributed to the lack of sustained output additionality e.g.: the transactional 
nature of the relationship with their creative partners; communication and co-ordination 
issues; and, in some cases, unsatisfying collaborations. Such data provide insights into the 
causal processes underlying additionality outcomes and potentially useful suggestions for 
subsequent implementation of any scheme beyond the initial policy experiment.  
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Industrial policy experiments conducted using an RCT+ or similar methodology therefore 
have significant advantages over a standard industrial policy pilot with ex post evaluation. 
The advantages are three-fold: substantive – providing potentially more robust evaluation 
results; resourced-based – in terms of more cost-effective evaluation; and, accessibility – in 
terms of the ease of communication of evaluation results. In substantive terms, randomisation 
helps the evaluator to avoid sample selection bias, while a longitudinal approach reduces the 
risk of incorrectly estimating policy effects due to the choice of an inappropriate impact 
period. We found important insights from later parts of the experiment which would be lost if 
it were not for the staged design of RCT+. The translation of short-term gains into longer 
term behavioural or network additionality was not significantly different in treatment group 
versus the control group, evident as the tendency of recipient firms to continue existing (or 
establish new) relationships with creative companies was not found. The incentive to initiate 
a policy on innovation partnerships, therefore, needs to be based on the investment having 
sufficient direct payback as behavioural by-products from the experience may be limited by 
exogenous factors. 
 
Mixed-methods also provide a useful complement, with qualitative approaches providing rich 
causal insights. Thus, while econometric analysis can shed light on the return on investment, 
behavioural and network additionalities, the use of interviews and ethnography can provide 
deeper levels of understanding allowing insight to the complexity of policy evaluation in 
social systems. Cross-methodological approaches require a multi-disciplinary research team 
that can best combine quantitative and qualitative expertise with reference to the paradigm 
and technical debates that characterise mixed methods using two or more modes of 
investigation (Tashakorri and Teddie 1998; Cresswell and Plano Clark 2011). RCT+ type 
evaluation approaches may also be cost-effective as they have more limited information 
requirements than the complex econometric models necessary to control for sample selection. 
However, the longitudinal element of RCT+ puts added pressure on the research team to find 
ways to maintain response rates over time and over different methods. This therefore needs a 
sympathetic group of respondents who have to bear with two (or more) modes of research 
investigation and a stronger focus on mid-term feedback to engage with respondents. This 
additional investment brings risks of higher drop-out rates due to fatigue but also brings 
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added benefits in providing more engaged respondents, data that can explain the correlations 
found, and insights to new questions to ask in later stages of the longitudinal survey design. 
Finally, evaluations based on randomisation, and the control group-treatment group 
comparison, generate more transparent and easily communicated policy messages than 
evaluations based on more complex econometric approaches.  
 
Beyond the internal validity and insights generated by the Creative Credits experiment, the 
other primary issue is external validity, i.e. the generalisability of the evaluation results to the 
wider population of firms (Garfinkel, Manski, and Michalopoulos 1990). To assess external 
validity we conducted a baseline survey of the characteristics of non-applicants to the 
Creative Credits scheme. This suggested that members of the treatment and control groups 
were more focused on innovation than non-applicants to the Creative Credits scheme, and 
also were more likely to have previously worked with external partners and had higher 
internal skill levels than non-applicants (Bakhshi et al. 2011, Annex 2)10. As each of these 
factors is likely to influence scheme outcomes this clearly limits the external generalisability 
of our evaluation results to the general population of SMEs. Two other limitations to external 
validity are also worth noting. First, even where applicant and population characteristics are 
similar short-term (and small-scale) experimental studies are unlikely to capture the macro 
and social effects highlighted by Garfinkel et al. (1990). One additional ‘macro’ effect not 
considered by Garfinkel et al. (1990) is the potential for industrial policy initiatives to 
generate potential synergies between schemes11. In the case of the Creative Credits scheme, 
for example, a number of scheme applicants had already received support from another 
innovation voucher scheme operating in the region which focussed on developing SME-
university linkages. Such synergies are likely to be positive in the medium-term but are 
unlikely to be evident during any short-term experimental evaluation. 
 
                                                 
10 See Nightingale and Coad (Nightingale and Coad 2014) for a recent discussion of heterogeneity in the 
population of small firms and some of the policy implications. 
11 Heckman and Smith (1995) consider a related point in their discussion of substitution bias. This relates to a 
situation where schemes are direct substitutes, however, rather than complementary to each other.  
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One other element of external validity which is of particular importance in industrial policy 
experiments relates to timing and the potential impact of the broader business climate. Our 
policy experiment took place between September 2009 and October 2010, a period when the 
UK economy was either contracting or experiencing only marginal growth. For example, one 
firm in the treatment group commented on their Creative Credits project that ‘it was useful at 
the time, but because of the recession and all the rest of it, I don’t believe we’ve really seen 
the benefit yet, but I suspect we will do’. Another SME could not fully implement the 
outcome of their project because it had not been able to secure bank funding, saying that ‘We 
are working our guts out, I have to try and raise finance’. Such comments were relatively 
typical, emphasising the strongly contingent nature of outcomes from single policy 
experiments. This type of consideration relating to the validity (either internal or external) of 
individual trials have suggested the potential value of triangulation or meta-analytical reviews 
across a number of RCTs. In medicine this approach is evident in the Cochrane Library 
which has established clear protocols for the conduct of individual RCTs and the undertaking 
of ‘reviews’ or meta-analyses of individual RCTs.  
 
Two recent Cochrane reviews illustrate this approach. One Cochrane review considering 
treatments for frozen shoulder synthesised the results from nineteen separate RCTs (Page et 
al. 2014). Another considered three RCTs in a treatment for early stage throat cancer (Yuan 
et al. 2014). In each case the reviews compare and contrast the results from the studies and 
identify generalised findings based on the principle that any one study may either reflect 
methodological or operational anomalies which may influence the results. In the context of 
medicine, however, interventions are primarily mechanical: a treatment which works with 
one human being is very likely to work with another independent of the context in which they 
are living. In terms of industrial support measures, however, the situation is arguably more 
complex given the heterogeneity of small firms, the social and interactive nature of business 
and the importance (and diversity) of the contexts in which firms operate. Internal and 
external validity may therefore be more difficult to maintain in industrial policy RCTs than in 
medicine. Arguably this means that standards of evidence should also be higher, requiring 
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consistent evidence from multiple RCTs from different contexts, before robust conclusions 
should be drawn12.   
 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to propose and assess the RCT+ evaluation approach. The RCT+ 
approach combines the random allocation of scheme applicants to control and treatment 
group with a mixed methods and longitudinal data collection strategy. The combination of the 
mixed methods and longitudinal aspects of the RCT+ approach provided valuable insights 
into the validity of the Creative Credits logic model. The longitudinal element of the 
evaluation method proved important in highlighting the time profile of additionality, while 
the mixed methods approach suggested some of the underlying causal factors. Overall, this 
suggests the value and feasibility of experimental methods for industrial policy evaluation, 
especially where quantitative analyses are complemented by structured qualitative data 
collection. Two other aspects of our evaluation experiment suggest, however, that 
generalisations from such small-scale experiments need to be made with care. First, it is 
important to consider the external validity of the evaluation in terms of both the 
representativeness of scheme applicants and the contingent nature of scheme outcomes. Both 
potentially limit the generalisability of results from the experimental evaluation beyond the 
immediate spatial and temporal context. Second, our evaluation is subject to the micro to 
macro biases discussed in Garfinkel et al. (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1995). 
Overcoming these limitations requires replication in different economic and market contexts 
and then synthesis along the lines of the approach adopted by the Cochrane Library in 
medicine.  
 
Experimental approaches to industrial policy evaluation remain rare despite the long tradition 
of experimental evaluation in social policy and development studies (although see Georgiadis 
and Pitelis, 2015). Hopefully, the RCT+ approach described here will encourage others to 
combine experimental and qualitative approaches to industrial policy evaluation. Policy 
makers may of course argue that random allocation of public subsidy is inefficient and fails 
                                                 
12 Innovation and management studies come closest to this approach in meta-analyses (Mueller, Rosenbusch, 
and Bausch 2013; Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, and Bausch 2011). 
24 
 
to maximise the potential benefits of public investment. In the short term this is most 
probably correct as random allocation is likely to mean that some poor projects will be 
supported. The counter argument – and in our view it is a powerful one – is that 
randomisation permits more effective policy evaluation and testing, and in the longer run may 
help avoid poor (and expensive) policy decisions. In the UK, at least, this is a message which 
policy makers have accepted with the establishment of a series of large-scale industrial policy 
experiments relating to Growth Vouchers, mentoring for high growth firms and university-
industry co-operation13. 
  
                                                 
13 For details of the Growth Vouchers programme see: https://www.gov.uk/apply-growth-vouchers.  
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Annex 1: Attrition and the representativeness of survey respondents 
Four surveys were conducted with the treatment and control groups. These were: the initial 
baseline Survey 1, conducted immediately after the award of the Creative Credits; Survey 2 
at the time projects were completed; Survey 3, six months after project completion; and, 
Survey 4, twelve months after project completion. Attrition was evident in each survey with 
response rates given in Table A1.1. Attrition was, unsurprisingly, worse among the control 
group as they had relatively little commitment to the Creative Credits initiative with 
respondent numbers by Survey 4 falling to 157, 52.2 per cent of those firms initially 
responding to Survey 1. In the treatment group attrition was less severe, with 78.0 per cent of 
Survey 1 respondents also responding to Survey 4.  
 
Table A1.1: Survey response and attrition by survey, wave and recipient 
 
Survey Survey 
 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
 No. No. No. No. % % % % 
Treatment  150 136 129 117 100.0 90.7 86.0 78.0 
Control  301 247 175 157 100.0 82.1 58.1 52.2 
Total  451 383 304 274 100.0 84.9 67.4 60.8 
 
During the course of the study considerable efforts were made to reduce attrition and ensure 
adequate response during the later surveys. Surveys were conducted online with firms being 
contacted initially by email and then (often repeatedly) by telephone to encourage response. 
Small cash incentives (£30) were also paid to firms in the control group to encourage their 
continued participation in the project. In Survey 2, for example, 167 of the 247 control 
businesses responding to the survey were incentivized in this way. One possibility is that 
these incentives might have biased the pattern of responses by control group companies. 
Investigation of respondent characteristics at the time of Survey 2, however, suggested that 
incentive payments had no impact on estimates of short-term additionality.  Following 
Survey 4 we also tested econometrically for the impact of these cash incentives on project 
additionality and found no evidence that incentives had any effect on the control group – 
treatment group comparison (Bakhshi et al. 2013, p. 59). 
 
26 
 
Given the level of attrition it is of considerable interest to consider whether those firms which 
responded to all four surveys were similar to those who dropped out of the group of 
respondents (Table A1.2). Reassuringly, for both the treatment and control groups, we see 
little systematic difference in the characteristics of respondents and non-respondents, 
suggesting that the propensity to drop-out of the project was not systematically related to 
firms’ key characteristics.  
Table A1.2: Characteristics drop-outs and responders 
 N Responders 
Drop-
outs t-statistic Signif. 
A. Treatment 
  
 
  Limited company 117/33 90.6 84.8 0.83 0.41 
Exporting firm 116/33 39.7 30.3 1.00 0.32 
   
 
  Internal R&D 113/31 69.9 54.8 1.50 0.14 
External R&D 114/28 21.9 25.0 -0.33 0.74 
Innovation  113/32 79.6 78.1 0.18 0.86 
Radical innovation 83/20 55.4 55.0 0.03 0.97 
   
 
  B. Control 
  
 
  Limited company 157/144 94.9 91.0 1.32 0.19 
Exporting firm 150/134 31.3 37.3 -1.06 0.29 
   
 
  Internal R&D 151/138 79.5 75.4 0.83 0.41 
External R&D 150/138 36.0 32.6 0.60 0.55 
Innovation  148/135 75.0 74.8 0.04 0.97 
Radical innovation 106/98 62.3 50.0 1.77* 0.08 
Note: Characteristics were measures in Survey 1. Sample numbers in first column relate to respondents to 
responders/drop outs. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent 
level. 
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Table 1: Comparison of characteristics of treatment and control groups 
 Treatment Group Control Group 
t-statistic Signif.  n % n 
 
% 
Limited company (%) 150 89.33 301 93.02 -1.26 0.21 
Exporting firm (%) 149 37.58 284 34.15 .70 0.48 
R&D inside the firm (%) 144 66.67 289 77.51 -2.33** 0.02 
R&D external to the firm 
(%) 
142 22.54 288 34.38 -2.63*** 0.01 
Product or service 
innovation (%) 
145 79.31 283 74.91 1.04 0.30 
New to the market 
innovation (%) 
103 55.34 204 56.37 -.17 0.86 
Notes: Table is based on the baseline survey. All measures are binary. Differences in response numbers reflect 
survey responses to each question and those selecting the “Don’t know’ response. ** denotes significance at the 
5 per cent level and *** at the 1 per cent level.   
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Table 2: Project Additionality - The likelihood of firms undertaking their innovation 
project 
Dependent variable: Whether or not firms undertook their project 
Number of observations   451 
Adjusted R-squared       0.653 
Variable     Coefficient     Std. Err.    t-statistic   Signif 
Creative Credit   0.840   0.028    29.11  0.000***   
Constant term    0.119     0.017    7.18  0.000***   
Notes: Analysis is based on respondents to the initial baseline survey undertaken immediately 
after the allocation of Creative Credits. *** denotes significance at the 1 per cent level. 
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Table 3: Output additionality in terms of the probability of innovation: 6 months and 12 
months after the completion of the Creative Credits projects 
 
N 
Control 
% firms 
Treatment 
% firms 
t-statistic Signif. 
A. After 6 months      
Product or service 
innovation 145/105 55.9 72.4 
 
2.740 
 
0.007*** 
New to the market 
innovation 126/92 23.0 35.9 
 
2.089 
 
0.038** 
Process innovation 142/105 47.2 63.8 2.618 0.009*** 
      
B. After 12 months 
     Product or service 
innovation 154/113 63.0 70.8 1.345 0.180 
New to the market 
innovation 135/97 32.6 40.2 
 
1.192 
 
0.235 
Process innovation 153/111 51.0 47.7 0.517 0.606 
      
 
N 
Control 
% 
Treatment 
% 
χ2(6) 
 
Signif. 
 
      
C. Average Sales Growth      
After 6 months 146/107 6.4 7.5 11.5 0.075* 
After 12 months 155/114 4.7 7.8 7.7 0.261 
      
Notes: Six and twelve months after the completion of the Creative Credits project firms were asked whether 
they had undertaken innovation in the previous 6 months, and for a banded estimate of their sales growth. Table 
is based on the longitudinal sample. Respondent numbers are given as “control group/treatment group”* denotes 
significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. The χ2(6) test statistic is 
based on the difference in distribution of sales growth rates between the treatment and control groups. 
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Table 4: Behavioural additionality - future innovation intentions after completion of 
Creative Credits projects 
 
 
 Control Treatment  
N Not 
Likely 
% 
Quite 
Likely 
% 
Very 
Likely 
% 
Not 
Likely 
% 
Quite 
Likely 
% 
Very 
Likely 
% χ2(2) Signif. 
A. After 6 months 
 
        
Goods or services 
248 
4.3 35.5 60.3 5.6 27.1 67.3 2.036 0.361 
Processes 
245 
7.9 34.5 57.6 8.5 33.0 58.5 .074 0.964 
Strategy  
235 
15.7 41.8 42.5 12.9 38.6 48.5 .912 0.634 
New technologies 
204 
38.5 36.8 24.8 41.4 42.5 16.1 2.321 0.313 
Organisation 
216 
39.5 28.7 31.8 44.8 32.2 23.0 1.984 0.371 
Marketing  
231 
10.4 40.7 48.9 11.5 45.8 42.7 .864 0.649 
          
B. After 12 months 
 
   
 
 
   
Goods or services 
257 
6.7 40.9 52.3 7.4 35.2 57.4 .876 0.645 
Processes 
260 
9.3 42.4 48.3 11.9 36.7 51.4 1.059 0.589 
Strategy  
249 
14.6 45.8 39.6 18.1 38.1 43.8 1.583 0.453 
New technologies 
206 
47.6 29.8 22.6 45.1 32.9 22.0 .224 0.894 
Organisation 
221 
49.3 36.6 14.2 47.1 32.2 20.7 1.676 0.433 
Marketing  
235 
18.4 38.2 43.4 15.2 48.5 36.4 2.464 0.292 
Notes: Six and twelve months after the end of the Creative Credits project firms were, for example, asked: 
‘Thinking about the next three years. How likely are you to develop new or significantly improved goods or 
services’. Similar questions were asked for other types of innovation. Table is based on the longitudinal sample. 
* denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level.  
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Table 5: Network Additionality – probability of innovation cooperation after 
completion of Creative Credits projects 
 N 
Control 
% firms 
Treatment 
% firms  
t-statistic Signif. 
A. After 6 months      
Other group companies 79/73 27.8 31.5 -0.490 0.625 
Suppliers  81/74 58.0 52.7 0.662 0.509 
Creative service suppliers 80/75 53.8 58.7 -0.613 0.540 
Customers 81/74 58.0 55.4 0.327 0.744 
Competitors 79/73 24.1 9.6 2.429 0.016 
Higher Education 
Institutes 81/75 22.2 20.0 0.338 0.736 
Public Laboratories 81/74 12.3 10.8 0.297 0.767 
      
B. After 12 months 
     Other group companies 93/75 33.3 37.3 -0.536 0.593 
Suppliers  95/77 52.6 63.6 -1.458 0.147 
Creative service suppliers 95/77 52.6 64.9 -1.637 0.104 
Customers 95/77 65.3 71.4 -0.864 0.389 
Competitors 96/77 24.0 32.5 -1.228 0.221 
Higher Education 
Institutes 93/78 29.0 26.9 0.305 0.761 
Public Laboratories 94/76 11.7 18.4 -1.204 0.231 
Notes: Six and twelve months after the completion of the Creative Credits project firms were asked ‘Over the 
next three years how likely are you to co-operate with the following types of innovation partners?’. Table is 
based on the longitudinal sample. Respondent numbers are given as “control group/treatment group”. * denotes 
significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level.  
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Figure 1: Logic model for Creative Credits  
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